The Basel ii
Accord
From the Basel ii Compliance Professionals Association (BCPA)
the largest association of Basel ii Professionals in the
world
301. Under either
approach, CRM in the form of guarantees and credit
derivatives must not reflect the effect of double
default (see paragraph 482).
As such, to the extent that
the CRM is recognised by the bank, the adjusted risk
weight will not be less than that of a comparable
direct exposure to the protection provider.
Consistent
with the standardised approach, banks may choose not
to recognise credit protection if doing so would result
in a higher capital requirement.
Recognition under
the foundation approach
302. For banks using the
foundation approach for LGD, the approach to guarantees
and credit derivatives closely follows the treatment
under the standardised approach as specified in
paragraphs 189 to 201.
The range of eligible guarantors
is the same as under the standardised approach except
that companies that are internally rated and associated
with a PD equivalent to A- or better may also be
recognised under the foundation approach.
To receive
recognition, the requirements outlined in paragraphs 189
to 194 must be met.
303. Eligible guarantees from
eligible guarantors will be recognised as follows:
•
For the covered portion of the exposure, a risk weight
is derived by taking:
– the risk-weight function
appropriate to the type of guarantor, and
– the PD
appropriate to the guarantor’s borrower grade, or some
grade between the underlying obligor and the
guarantor’s borrower grade if the bank deems a full
substitution treatment not to be warranted.
• The
bank may replace the LGD of the underlying transaction
with the LGD applicable to the guarantee taking into
account seniority and any collateralisation of a
guaranteed commitment.
304. The uncovered portion of
the exposure is assigned the risk weight associated
with the underlying obligor.
305. Where
partial coverage exists, or where there is a currency
mismatch between the underlying obligation and the
credit protection, it is necessary to split the exposure
into a covered and an uncovered amount.
The treatment
in the foundation approach follows that outlined in
the standardised approach in paragraphs 198 to 200, and
depends upon whether the cover is proportional or
tranched.
Recognition under the advanced
approach
306. Banks using the advanced approach for
estimating LGDs may reflect the risk mitigating effect
of guarantees and credit derivatives through either
adjusting PD or LGD estimates.
Whether adjustments
are done through PD or LGD, they must be done in
a consistent manner for a given guarantee or credit
derivative type. In doing so, banks must not include
the effect of double default in such adjustments.
Thus,
the adjusted risk weight must not be less than that
of a comparable direct exposure to the protection
provider.
307. A bank relying on own-estimates of LGD
has the option to adopt the treatment outlined above
for banks under the foundation IRB approach (paragraphs
302 to 305), or to make an adjustment to its LGD
estimate of the exposure to reflect the presence of
the guarantee or credit derivative.
Under this
option, there are no limits to the range of
eligible guarantors although the set of minimum
requirements provided in paragraphs 483 and
484 concerning the type of guarantee must be
satisfied.
For credit derivatives, the
requirements of paragraphs 488 and 489 must be
satisfied.*
*
When credit derivatives do not cover the restructuring
of the underlying obligation, the partial recognition
set out in paragraph 192 applies.
Operational requirements for recognition
of double default
307(i). A bank using an IRB
approach has the option of using the substitution
approach in determining the appropriate capital
requirement for an exposure.
However, for
exposures hedged by one of the following instruments
the double default framework according to paragraphs
284 (i) to 284 (iii) may be applied subject to the
additional operational requirements set out in
paragraph 307 (ii).
A bank may decide separately for
each eligible exposure to apply either the double
default framework or the substitution approach.
(a)
Single-name, unfunded credit derivatives (e.g. credit
default swaps) or single name guarantees.
(b)
First-to-default basket products — the double default
treatment will be applied to the asset within the
basket with the lowest risk-weighted amount.
(c)
nth-to-default basket products — the protection obtained
is only eligible for consideration under the double
default framework if eligible (n–1)th
default protection has also been obtained or where
(n–1) of the assets within the basket have already
defaulted.
307(ii). The double default framework
is only applicable where the following conditions
are met.
(a) The risk weight that is associated
with the exposure prior to the application of
the framework does not already factor in any aspect
of the credit protection.
(b) The entity selling
credit protection is a bank *, investment firm or
insurance company (but only those that are in the
business of providing credit protection, including
mono-lines, re-insurers, and non-sovereign credit export
agencies), ** referred to as a financial firm,
that:
• is regulated in a manner broadly equivalent
to that in this Framework (where there is appropriate
supervisory oversight and transparency/ market
discipline), or externally rated as at least investment
grade by a credit rating agency deemed suitable for
this purpose by supervisors;
• had an internal rating
with a PD equivalent to or lower than that associated
with an external A– rating at the time the credit
protection for an exposure was first provided or for
any period of time thereafter; and
• has an internal
rating with a PD equivalent to or lower than
that associated with an external investment-grade
rating.
*
This does not include PSEs and MDBs, even though claims
on these may be treated as claims on banks according to
paragraph 230.
(c) The underlying obligation is:
• a
corporate exposure as defined in paragraphs 218 to 228
(excluding specialised lending exposures for which
the supervisory slotting criteria approach described
in paragraphs 275 to 282 is being used); or
• a claim
on a PSE that is not a sovereign exposure as defined
in paragraph 229; or
• a loan extended to a small
business and classified as a retail exposure as
defined in paragraph 231.
(d) The underlying obligor
is not:
• a financial firm as defined in (b); or
•
a member of the same group as the protection
provider.
(e) The credit protection meets the minimum
operational requirements for such instruments as
outlined in paragraphs 189 to 193.
(f) In
keeping with paragraph 190 for guarantees, for any
recognition of double default effects for both
guarantees and credit derivatives a bank must have
the right and expectation to receive payment from the
credit protection provider without having to take
legal action in order to pursue the counterparty
for payment.
To the extent possible, a bank should
take steps to satisfy itself that the protection
provider is willing to pay promptly if a credit event
should occur.
(g) The purchased credit protection
absorbs all credit losses incurred on the
hedged portion of an exposure that arise due to the
credit events outlined in the contract.
(h) If the
payout structure provides for physical settlement, then
there must be legal certainty with respect to the
deliverability of a loan, bond, or contingent liability.
If a bank intends to deliver an obligation other than
the underlying exposure, it must ensure that the
deliverable obligation is sufficiently liquid so that
the bank would have the ability to purchase it for
delivery in accordance with the contract.
(i) The
terms and conditions of credit protection arrangements
must be legally confirmed in writing by both the
credit protection provider and the bank.
(j) In the
case of protection against dilution risk, the seller of
purchased receivables must not be a member of the
same group as the protection provider.
(k) There is
no excessive correlation between the creditworthiness of
a protection provider and the obligor of the
underlying exposure due to their performance being
dependent on common factors beyond the systematic risk
factor.
The bank has a process to detect such
excessive correlation.
An example of a situation
in which such excessive correlation would arise is
when a protection provider guarantees the debt of a
supplier of goods or services and the supplier derives
a high proportion of its income or revenue from the
protection provider.
*
This does not include PSEs and MDBs, even though claims
on these may be treated as claims on banks according to
paragraph 230.
**
By non-sovereign it is meant that credit protection in
question does not benefit from any explicit sovereign
counter-guarantee.
(iii) Exposure at default
(EAD)
308. The following sections apply to both on
and off-balance sheet positions.
All exposures are
measured gross of specific provisions or partial
write-offs.
The EAD on drawn amounts should not be
less than the sum of
(i) the amount by which a bank’s
regulatory capital would be reduced if the exposure
were written-off fully, and
(ii) any specific
provisions and partial write-offs.
When the
difference between the instrument’s EAD and the sum of
(i) and (ii) is positive, this amount is termed a
discount.
The calculation of risk-weighted assets is
independent of any discounts.
Under the limited
circumstances described in paragraph 380, discounts
may be included in the measurement of total eligible
provisions for purposes of the EL-provision
calculation set out in Section III.G.
Exposure
measurement for on-balance sheet items
309.
On-balance sheet netting of loans and deposits will be
recognised subject to the same conditions as under
the standardised approach (see paragraph 188).
Where
currency or maturity mismatched on-balance sheet
netting exists, the treatment follows
the standardised approach, as set out in paragraphs
200 and 202 to 205.
Exposure measurement for
off-balance sheet items (with the exception of FX and
interest rate, equity, and commodity-related
derivatives)
310. For off-balance sheet items,
exposure is calculated as the committed but
undrawn amount multiplied by a CCF. There are two
approaches for the estimation of CCFs: a foundation
approach and an advanced approach.
EAD under the
foundation approach
311. The types of instruments and
the CCFs applied to them are the same as those in the
standardised approach, as outlined in paragraphs 82 to
89 with the exception of commitments, Note Issuance
Facilities (NIFs) and Revolving Underwriting Facilities
(RUFs).
312. A CCF of 75%
will be applied to
commitments, NIFs and RUFs regardless of the maturity
of the underlying facility. This does not apply to those
facilities which are uncommitted, that are
unconditionally cancellable, or that effectively provide
for automatic cancellation, for example due to
deterioration in a borrower’s creditworthiness, at any
time by the bank without prior notice.
A CCF of 0%
will be applied to these facilities.
313. The amount
to which the CCF is applied is the lower of the value of
the unused committed credit line, and the value that
reflects any possible constraining availability of
the facility, such as the existence of a ceiling on
the potential lending amount which is related to a
borrower’s reported cash flow.
If the facility is
constrained in this way, the bank must
have sufficient line monitoring and management
procedures to support this contention.
314. In order
to apply a 0% CCF for unconditionally and immediately
cancellable corporate overdrafts and other
facilities, banks must demonstrate that they actively
monitor the financial condition of the borrower, and
that their internal control systems are such
that they could cancel the facility upon evidence of
a deterioration in the credit quality of
the borrower.
315. Where a commitment is obtained
on another off-balance sheet exposure, banks under
the foundation approach are to apply the lower of the
applicable CCFs.
EAD under the advanced
approach
316. Banks which meet the minimum
requirements for use of their own estimates of
EAD (see paragraphs 474 to 478) will be allowed to
use their own internal estimates of CCFs across
different product types provided the exposure is not
subject to a CCF of 100% in the foundation approach
(see paragraph 311).
Exposure measurement for
transactions that expose banks to counterparty credit
risk
317. Measures of exposure for SFTs and OTC
derivatives that expose banks to counterparty credit
risk under the IRB approach will be calculated as per
the rules set forth in Annex 4 of this
Framework.
(iv) Effective maturity (M)
318. For
banks using the foundation approach for corporate
exposures, effective maturity (M) will be 2.5 years
except for repo-style transactions where the effective
maturity will be 6 months.
National supervisors may
choose to require all banks in their jurisdiction
(those using the foundation and advanced approaches)
to measure M for each facility using the definition
provided below.
319. Banks using any element of
the advanced IRB approach are required to
measure effective maturity for each facility as
defined below.
However, national supervisors
may exempt facilities to certain smaller domestic
corporate borrowers from the explicit
maturity adjustment if the reported sales (i.e.
turnover) as well as total assets for the
consolidated group of which the firm is a part of are
less than €500 million.
The consolidated group has
to be a domestic company based in the country where
the exemption is applied.
If adopted, national
supervisors must apply such an exemption to all IRB
banks using the advanced approach in that country,
rather than on a bank-by-bank basis.
If the exemption is
applied, all exposures to qualifying smaller domestic
firms will be assumed to have an average maturity of
2.5 years, as under the foundation IRB approach.
320.
Except as noted in paragraph 321, M is defined as the
greater of one year and the remaining effective
maturity in years as defined below. In all cases, M will
be no greater than 5 years.
• For an instrument
subject to a determined cash flow schedule, effective
maturity M is defined as:

where CFt denotes
the cash flows (principal, interest payments and
fees) contractually payable by the borrower in period
t.
• If a bank is not in a position to calculate the
effective maturity of the contracted payments as
noted above, it is allowed to use a more conservative
measure of M such as that it equals the maximum
remaining time (in years) that the borrower
is permitted to take to fully discharge its
contractual obligation (principal, interest,
and fees) under the terms of loan agreement.
Normally, this will correspond to the nominal
maturity of the instrument.
• For derivatives subject
to a master netting agreement, the weighted
average maturity of the transactions should be used
when applying the explicit maturity adjustment.
Further, the notional amount of each transaction should
be used for weighting the maturity.
321. The
one-year floor does not apply to certain short-term
exposures, comprising fully or nearly-fully
collateralised * capital market-driven transactions
(i.e. OTC derivatives transactions and margin
lending) and repo-style transactions (i.e. repos/reverse
repos and securities lending/borrowing) with an
original maturity of less then one year, where
the documentation contains daily remargining clauses.
For all eligible transactions the documentation must
require daily revaluation, and must include provisions
that must allow for the prompt liquidation or setoff
of the collateral in the event of default or failure to
re-margin.
The maturity of such transactions must be
calculated as the greater of one-day, and
the effective maturity (M, consistent with the
definition above).
*
The
intention is to include both parties of a transaction
meeting these conditions where neither of the parties is
systematically under-collateralised.
322. In addition to the
transactions considered in paragraph 321 above, other
short-term exposures with an original maturity of
less than one year that are not part of a
bank’s ongoing financing of an obligor may be
eligible for exemption from the one-year floor.
After
a careful review of the particular circumstances in
their jurisdictions, national
supervisors treatment.
The results of these
reviews might, for example, include transactions such
as:
• Some capital market-driven transactions and
repo-style transactions that might not fall within
the scope of paragraph 321;
• Some short-term
self-liquidating trade transactions. Import and export
letters of credit and similar transactions could be
accounted for at their actual
remaining maturity;
• Some exposures arising from
settling securities purchases and sales. This
could also include overdrafts arising from failed
securities settlements provided that such overdrafts
do not continue more than a short, fixed number of
business days;
• Some exposures arising from cash
settlements by wire transfer, including
overdrafts arising from failed transfers provided
that such overdrafts do not continue more than a
short, fixed number of business days;
• Some
exposures to banks arising from foreign exchange
settlements; and
• Some short-term loans and
deposits.
323. For transactions falling within the
scope of paragraph 321 subject to a master netting
agreement, the weighted average maturity of the
transactions should be used when applying the
explicit maturity adjustment.
A floor equal to the
minimum holding period for the transaction type set
out in paragraph 167 will apply to the average.
Where
more than one transaction type is contained in the
master netting agreement a floor equal to the
highest holding period will apply to the average.
Further, the notional amount of each
transaction should be used for weighting
maturity.
324. Where there is no explicit adjustment,
the effective maturity (M) assigned to all exposures
is set at 2.5 years unless otherwise specified in
paragraph 318.
Treatment of maturity
mismatches
325. The treatment of maturity mismatches
under IRB is identical to that in the standardised
approach ─ see paragraphs 202 to 205.
D. Rules for
Retail Exposures
326. Section D presents in detail
the method of calculating the UL capital
requirements for retail exposures. Section D.1
provides three risk-weight functions, one for
residential mortgage exposures, a second for
qualifying revolving retail exposures, and a third for
other retail exposures.
Section D.2 presents the risk
components to serve as inputs to the risk weight functions.
The method of calculating
expected losses, and for determining the difference
between that measure and provisions is described in
Section III.G.
1. Risk-weighted assets for retail
exposures
327. There are three separate risk-weight
functions for retail exposures, as defined
in paragraphs 328 to 330. Risk weights for retail
exposures are based on separate assessments of PD and
LGD as inputs to the risk-weight functions.
None of the
three retail risk-weight functions contains an
explicit maturity adjustment.
Throughout this section,
PD and LGD are measured as decimals, and EAD is
measured as currency (e.g. euros).
(i)
Residential mortgage exposures
328. For exposures
defined in paragraph 231 that are not in default and are
secured or partly secured * by residential mortgages,
risk weights will be assigned based on the following
formula:
Correlation (R) = 0.15
Capital
requirement (K) = LGD × N[(1 – R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1
– R))^0.5 × G(0.999)] – PD x LGD
Risk-weighted
assets = K x 12.5 x EAD
The capital requirement (K)
for a defaulted exposure is equal to the greater of zero
and the difference between its LGD (described in
paragraph 468) and the bank’s best estimate
of expected loss (described in paragraph 471).
The
risk-weighted asset amount for the defaulted exposure
is the product of K, 12.5, and the EAD.
*
This means that risk weights for residential mortgages
also apply to the unsecured portion of such residential
mortgages.
(ii)
Qualifying revolving retail exposures
329. For
qualifying revolving retail exposures as defined in
paragraph 234 that are not in default, risk weights
are defined based on the following
formula:
Correlation (R) = 0.04
Capital
requirement (K) = LGD × N[(1 – R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1
– R))^0.5 × G(0.999)] – PD x LGD
Risk-weighted
assets = K x 12.5 x EAD
The capital requirement (K)
for a defaulted exposure is equal to the greater of zero
and the difference between its LGD (described in
paragraph 468) and the bank’s best estimate
of expected loss (described in paragraph 471).
The
risk-weighted asset amount for the defaulted exposure
is the product of K, 12.5, and the EAD.
(iii) Other
retail exposures
330. For all other retail exposures
that are not in default, risk weights are assigned
based on the following function, which allows
correlation to vary with PD:
Correlation (R) = 0.03 ×
(1 – EXP(-35 × PD)) / (1 – EXP(-35)) + 0.16 × [1 – (1
– EXP(-35 × PD))/(1 – EXP(-35))]
Capital requirement
(K) = LGD × N[(1 – R)^-0.5 × G(PD) + (R / (1 – R))^0.5 ×
G(0.999)] – PD x LGD
Risk-weighted assets = K x
12.5 x EAD
The capital requirement (K) for a
defaulted exposure is equal to the greater of zero and
thedifference between its LGD (described in
paragraph 468) and the bank’s best estimate of expected loss
(described in paragraph 471).
The risk-weighted asset
amount for the defaulted exposure is the product of
K, 12.5, and the EAD.
Illustrative risk weights are
shown in Annex 5.
2. Risk components
(i)
Probability of default (PD) and loss given default
(LGD)
331. For each identified pool of retail
exposures, banks are expected to provide an estimate
of the PD and LGD associated with the pool, subject to
the minimum requirements as set out in Section III.H.
Additionally, the PD for retail exposures is the greater
of the one year PD associated with the internal
borrower grade to which the pool of retail exposures
is assigned or 0.03%.
(ii) Recognition of
guarantees and credit derivatives
332. Banks may
reflect the risk-reducing effects of guarantees and
credit derivatives, either in support of an
individual obligation or a pool of exposures, through an
adjustment of either the PD or LGD estimate, subject
to the minimum requirements in paragraphs 480 to 489.
Whether adjustments are done through PD or LGD, they
must be done in a consistent manner for a given
guarantee or credit derivative type.
333. Consistent
with the requirements outlined above for corporate,
sovereign, and bank exposures, banks must not include
the effect of double default in such adjustments.
The adjusted risk weight must not be less than that
of a comparable direct exposure to the protection
provider. Consistent with the standardised approach,
banks may choose not to recognise credit protection
if doing so would result in a higher capital
requirement.
(iii) Exposure at default (EAD)
334.
Both on and off-balance sheet retail exposures are
measured gross of specific provisions or partial
write-offs.
The EAD on drawn amounts should not be less
than the sum of
(i) the amount by which a bank’s
regulatory capital would be reduced if the exposure
were written-off fully, and
(ii) any specific
provisions and partial write-offs.
When the
difference between the instrument’s EAD and the sum
of (i) and (ii) is positive, this amount is termed
a discount.
The calculation of risk-weighted assets
is independent of any discounts.
Under the limited
circumstances described in paragraph 380, discounts may
be included in the measurement of total eligible
provisions for purposes of the EL-provision calculation
set out in Section III.G.
335. On-balance sheet
netting of loans and deposits of a bank to or from a
retail customer will be permitted subject to the same
conditions outlined in paragraph 188 of
the standardised approach. For retail off-balance
sheet items, banks must use their own estimates of
CCFs provided the minimum requirements in paragraphs 474
to 477 and 479 are satisfied.
336. For retail
exposures with uncertain future drawdown such as credit
cards, banks must take into account their history
and/or expectation of additional drawings prior to
default in their overall calibration of loss
estimates. In particular, where a bank does not
reflect conversion factors for undrawn lines in its
EAD estimates, it must reflect in its LGD
estimates the likelihood of additional drawings prior
to default.
Conversely, if the bank does
not incorporate the possibility of additional
drawings in its LGD estimates, it must do so in
its EAD estimates.
337. When only the drawn
balances of retail facilities have been securitised,
banks must ensure that they continue to hold required
capital against their share (i.e. seller’s interest)
of undrawn balances related to the securitised
exposures using the IRB approach to credit risk.
This
means that for such facilities, banks must reflect the
impact of CCFs in their EAD estimates rather than in
the LGD estimates. For determining the EAD associated
with the seller’s interest in the undrawn lines, the
undrawn balances of securitised exposures would be
allocated between the seller’s and investors’ interests
on a pro rata basis, based on the proportions of the
seller’s and investors’ shares of the securitised drawn
balances.
The investors’ share of undrawn balances
related to the securitised exposures is subject to
the treatment in paragraph 643.
338. To the extent
that foreign exchange and interest rate commitments
exist within a bank’s retail portfolio for IRB
purposes, banks are not permitted to provide their
internal assessments of credit equivalent amounts.
Instead, the rules for the standardised
approach continue to apply.
E. Rules for Equity
Exposures
339. Section E presents the method of
calculating the UL capital requirements for
equity exposures. Section E.1 discusses
(a) the
market-based approach (which is further
subdivided into a simple risk weight method and an
internal models method), and
(b) the PD/LGD approach.
The risk components are provided in Section E.2.
The
method of calculating expected losses, and for
determining the difference between that measure
and provisions is described in Section III.G.
1.
Risk-weighted assets for equity exposures
340.
Risk-weighted assets for equity exposures in the trading
book are subject to the market risk capital
rules.
341. There are two approaches to calculate
risk-weighted assets for equity exposures not held in
the trading book: a market-based approach and a PD/LGD
approach.
Supervisors will decide which approach or
approaches will be used by banks, and in what
circumstances.
Certain equity holdings are excluded
as defined in paragraphs 356 to 358 and are subject
to the capital charges required under the
standardised approach.
342. Where supervisors permit
both methodologies, banks’ choices must be
made consistently, and in particular not determined
by regulatory arbitrage considerations.
(i)
Market-based approach
343. Under the market-based
approach, institutions are permitted to calculate
the minimum capital requirements for their banking
book equity holdings using one or both of
two separate and distinct methods: a simple risk
weight method or an internal models method.
The
method used should be consistent with the amount and
complexity of the institution’s equity holdings and
commensurate with the overall size and sophistication of
the institution.
Supervisors may require the use of
either method based on the individual circumstances
of an institution.
Simple risk weight
method
344. Under the simple risk weight method, a
300% risk weight is to be applied to equity holdings
that are publicly traded and a 400% risk weight is to be
applied to all other equity holdings.
A
publicly traded holding is defined as any equity
security traded on a recognised security
exchange.
345. Short cash positions and derivative
instruments held in the banking book are permitted to
offset long positions in the same individual stocks
provided that these instruments have been explicitly
designated as hedges of specific equity holdings and
that they have remaining maturities of at least one
year.
Other short positions are to be treated as if
they are long positions with the relevant risk weight
applied to the absolute value of each position.
In
the context of maturity mismatched positions, the
methodology is that for corporate
exposures.
Internal models method
346. IRB banks
may use, or may be required by their supervisor to use,
internal risk measurement models to calculate the
risk-based capital requirement.
Under this
alternative, banks must hold capital equal to the
potential loss on the institution’s equity holdings
as derived using internal value-at-risk models
subject to the 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence
interval of the difference between quarterly returns and
an appropriate risk-free rate computed over a
long-term sample period.
The capital charge would be
incorporated into an institution’s risk-based capital
ratio through the calculation of risk-weighted
equivalent assets.
347. The risk weight used to
convert holdings into risk-weighted equivalent assets
would be calculated by multiplying the derived
capital charge by 12.5 (i.e. the inverse of
the minimum 8% risk-based capital requirement).
Capital charges calculated under the internal models
method may be no less than the capital charges that
would be calculated under the simple risk weight
method using a 200% risk weight
for publicly traded
equity holdings and a 300% risk weight for all other
equity holdings.
These minimum capital charges would
be calculated separately using the methodology of the
simple risk weight approach.
Further, these minimum
risk weights are to apply at the individual exposure
level rather than at the portfolio level.
348. A
bank may be permitted by its supervisor to employ
different market-based approaches to different
portfolios based on appropriate considerations and where
the bank itself uses different approaches
internally.
349. Banks are permitted to recognise
guarantees but not collateral obtained on an equity
position wherein the capital requirement is determined
through use of the market based approach.
(ii)
PD/LGD approach
350. The minimum requirements and
methodology for the PD/LGD approach for
equity exposures (including equity of companies that
are included in the retail asset class) are the same
as those for the IRB foundation approach for corporate
exposures subject to the following
specifications: *
• The bank’s estimate of the PD of
a corporate entity in which it holds an
equity position must satisfy the same requirements as
the bank’s estimate of the PD of a corporate entity
where the bank holds debt.**
If a bank does not hold debt of
the company in whose equity it has invested, and does
not have sufficient information on the position of
that company to be able to use the applicable definition
of default in practice but meets the other standards,
a 1.5 scaling factor will be applied to the risk
weights derived from the corporate risk-weight function,
given the PD set by the bank.
If, however, the bank’s
equity holdings are material and it is permitted to use
a PD/LGD approach for regulatory purposes but the
bank has not yet met the relevant standards, the
simple risk-weight method under the market-based
approach will apply.
• An LGD of 90% would be
assumed in deriving the risk weight for equity
exposures.
• For these purposes, the risk weight is
subject to a five-year maturity adjustment whether or
not the bank is using the explicit approach to maturity
elsewhere in its IRB portfolio.
*
There is no advanced approach for
equity exposures, given the 90% LGD assumption.
**
In
practice, if there is both an equity exposure and an IRB
credit exposure to the same counterparty, a default on
the credit exposure would thus trigger a simultaneous
default for regulatory purposes on the equity exposure.
351. Under the
PD/LGD approach, minimum risk weights as set out in
paragraphs 352 and 353 apply.
When the sum of UL and
EL associated with the equity exposure results
in less capital than would be required from
application of one of the minimum risk weights,
the minimum risk weights must be used.
In other
words, the minimum risk weights must be applied, if
the risk weights calculated according to paragraph 350
plus the EL associated with the equity exposure
multiplied by 12.5 are smaller than the applicable
minimum risk weights.
352. A minimum risk weight of
100% applies for the following types of equities for as
long as the portfolio is managed in the manner
outlined below:
• Public equities where the
investment is part of a long-term customer
relationship, any capital gains are not expected to
be realised in the short term and there is
no anticipation of (above trend) capital gains in the
long term.
It is expected that in almost all cases,
the institution will have lending and/or general
banking relationships with the portfolio company so
that the estimated probability of default is readily
available.
Given their long-term nature, specification
of an appropriate holding period for such investments
merits careful consideration.
In general, it
is expected that the bank will hold the equity over
the long term (at least five years).
• Private
equities where the returns on the investment are based
on regular and periodic cash flows not derived from
capital gains and there is no expectation of future
(above trend) capital gain or of realising any existing
gain.
353. For all other equity positions, including
net short positions (as defined in paragraph 345),
capital charges calculated under the PD/LGD approach may
be no less than the capital charges that would be
calculated under a simple risk weight method
using a
200% risk weight for publicly traded equity holdings
and a 300% risk weight for all other equity
holdings.
354. The maximum risk weight for the PD/LGD
approach for equity exposures is 1250%.
This maximum
risk weight can be applied, if risk weights calculated
according to paragraph 350 plus the EL associated
with the equity exposure multiplied by 12.5 exceed the
1250% risk weight.
Alternatively, banks may deduct
the entire equity exposure amount, assuming
it represents the EL amount, 50% from Tier 1 capital
and 50% from Tier 2 capital.
In practice, if there
is both an equity exposure and an IRB credit exposure to
the same counterparty, a default on the credit
exposure would thus trigger a simultaneous default for
regulatory purposes on the
equity exposure.
355. Hedging for PD/LGD
equity exposures is, as for corporate exposures, subject
to an LGD of 90% on the exposure to the provider of
the hedge.
For these purposes equity positions will
be treated as having a five-year maturity.
(iii)
Exclusions to the market-based and PD/LGD
approaches
356. Equity holdings in entities whose
debt obligations qualify for a zero risk weight
under the standardised approach to credit risk can be
excluded from the IRB approaches to equity (including
those publicly sponsored entities where a zero risk
weight can be applied), at the discretion of the
national supervisor.
If a national supervisor makes such
an exclusion this will be available to all
banks.
357. To promote specified sectors of the
economy, supervisors may exclude from the IRB capital
charges equity holdings made under legislated programmes
that provide significant subsidies for the investment
to the bank and involve some form of
government oversight and restrictions on the equity
investments.
Example of restrictions are
limitations on the size and types of businesses in
which the bank is investing, allowable amounts
of ownership interests, geographical location and
other pertinent factors that limit the potential risk
of the investment to the bank.
Equity holdings made
under legislated programmes can only be excluded from
the IRB approaches up to an aggregate of
10% of Tier 1
plus Tier 2 capital.
358. Supervisors may also
exclude the equity exposures of a bank from the
IRB treatment based on materiality.
The equity
exposures of a bank are considered material if their
aggregate value, excluding all legislative programmes
discussed in paragraph 357, exceeds, on average over
the prior year, 10% of bank's Tier 1 plus Tier 2
capital.
This materiality threshold is lowered to 5%
of a bank's Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital if the
equity portfolio consists of less than 10 individual
holdings.
National supervisors may use
lower materiality thresholds.
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